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Abstract 
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the impact of Chinese steel consumption upon the 
world price of steel mill products and inputs over the past several years. We focus upon the 
inputs of steel scrap and iron ore as inputs involving competing technologies. We find that an 
equilibrium relationship exists between China’s consumption of steel and prices for steel and its 
inputs, but we cannot conclude from our analysis that variations in Chinese consumption drive 
variations in the prices of steel or its inputs. 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
 China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse is paralleled by the growth of its steel 
industry. During the years between 1998 and 2006, China has become the world’s largest 
producer of steel, producing 423 million tons in 2006, representing a 50% growth from 2004, 
when the country produced 280 million tons. During the same two-year period, production in the 
rest of the world (ROW) grew by a more modest 7%. China’s share of world steel production 
grew from 13.5% to almost 35% during the period of our study, as is illustrated by Figure 1, 
which compares production in China to that of the ROW between April 1998 and December 
2007 (all figures and tables are appended to this paper).  
Consumption levels in China have closely followed production levels, indicating that 
Chinese industry consumes the vast majority of the steel produced, and also that Chinese 
production levels generally supply the needs of domestic consumers1. Figure 2, which compares 
China’s production, balance of trade (exports minus imports) and a U.S. steel price index, shows 
                                                 
1 This is not to say that the industry produces the mix of products required to satisfy all Chinese steel users: only that 
the raw consumption and production levels are in line with one another. The industry does not, for example, produce 
enough high quality steels to satisfy domestic demand for “flat” products (Brandt et al. 2008). This aspect of the 
industry is lost in the use of crude steel trade statistics. 
that the absolute value of China’s balance of steel trade has rarely exceeded 10% of domestic 
production. 
The sudden growth of China’s steel consumption accompanied a drastic break of steel 
prices from historical levels. A comparison between China’s production, balance of steel trade 
and the price of steel in the U.S. (Figure 2) shows that as China’s production and consumption 
have ramped up, so have steel prices and Chinese exports of steel products. Prices jump 
considerably from 2004 to 2005, and then remain high even as China’s trade balance in steel 
turns sharply positive after 2005.  
As Chinese consumption and steel prices rose, so too did prices for steel inputs: namely 
iron ore, coke and steel scrap. Iron ore and coke are combined in blast furnaces at larger, 
integrated plants for raw steel production, while steel scrap is recycled in smaller plants known 
as mini-mills by being heated with electric current. The value-added of steel produced from 
integrated mills in the U.S. is generally higher than that of mini-mills. The former produce steel 
for use in the manufacture of appliances and automobiles, which generally require more specific 
traits than steel bars used in construction and rails, which are produced almost exclusively by 
mini-mills in the U.S. However, in the rest of the world (China included), integrated producers 
still produce steel bars. 
Figure 3 below compares the price of iron ore in the U.S. to China’s iron ore trade deficit 
and steel production between 1990 and 2006. Note that the Chinese trade deficit in iron ore, 
unlike its deficit in steel, does not shrink but nearly doubles between 2003 and 2006. During the 
same time interval, the price of iron ore in the United States rises by 66%. As in steel, China’s 
share of world iron consumption has increased dramatically since the turn of the century. 
Figures 4 and 5 below, which show the same data as Figure 3 for coking coal and scrap 
steel, show a similar rise in the cost of inputs as Chinese steel production ramps up. Unlike the 
case of iron ore, however, in the case of scrap metal China’s trade deficit does not increase 
substantially as prices rise, and China actually maintains a surplus in coking coal.  
 Because of the relatively recent nature of the phenomena elaborated above, little 
empirical work has been done to determine the impact of Chinese production on steel prices. 
Most researchers conclude that Chinese conditions are driving prices. Only one study, to our 
knowledge, has attempted to econometrically gauge the impact of China’s demand for steel on 
U.S. steel prices. Liebman’s (2006) analysis on the impact of 2003 safeguards on U.S. steel 
prices showed that Chinese steel demand played a statistically significant role in U.S. steel price 
movements, but his analysis suggests that it takes upwards of nine lags for this impact to be 
realized. This analysis did not incorporate Chinese steel production into its model and focused 
mainly on Chinese steel imports. It therefore does not show the indirect effect of Chinese 
consumption on steel prices by omitting this variable’s impact on the price of steel inputs. 
 Unlike Liebman (2006), we do not explicitly incorporate U.S. domestic economic 
variables into our model because we assume the market for steel products to be global in nature. 
Regression analysis of steel prices in various markets shows that prices in the various world 
markets are highly correlated. Furthermore, while the U.S. share of world steel production and 
consumption is significant (around 10% in each case), changes in capacity and consumption in 
the U.S. over the period under investigation are relatively small compared to the drastic increase 
in world, and specifically Chinese, production and consumption. U.S. production and 
consumption vary by less than 15 million tons during the course of the period, while Chinese 
production and consumption vary by several hundred million tons. We therefore assume that 
variables pertaining to U.S. steel production only affect the model via its inclusion in world 
production outside of China. We focus instead upon consumption in China to explain U.S. 
prices, which we use as a proxy for world prices. Our expectation is that this variable will be the 
most useful in explaining price movements for steel and its inputs. 
As in Liebman (2006), we include iron ore and steel scrap prices in our analysis in order 
to determine the impact of Chinese production on these variables, which in turn impact steel 
prices. We also estimate our model for two different classes of steel, including an index for 
“long” steel products and another for “flat” steel products. As Liebman notes, long products are 
produced almost exclusively by scrap producers in United States, while flat products, especially 
those higher in value added, are the major product of integrated steel producers. Our expectation 
is that if Chinese consumption affects one input more than another, its impact on the price of the 
steels produced using that input will be greater. 
 Our analysis also diverges from that of Liebman (2006) in that we do not control for the 
real exchange rate of the U.S. vis-à-vis the world. During the course of our analysis, we noted 
that adding this variable tended to adversely impact the fit of our model, and we therefore 
excluded it. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 To test the hypothesis that Chinese consumption is a driving force behind steel, iron and 
scrap prices, we estimate reduced form vector autoregressive (VAR) models using each of the 
data series listed above, and then perform Granger causality tests on the data. To capture short-
term and long-term interactions among the variables, we perform Granger causality tests at two 
and six lags. 
 We estimate the reduced form VAR model: 
∑ +Δ=Δ −p
i
titit YAY ε  
for p = 2 and 6, where Yt is a vector including all of our data series, Δ is the difference operator, 
and A1-Ap are matrices of parameters. It is upon this model that we perform Granger causality 
tests. 
After performing our Granger causality analysis, we test our data series for cointegration. 
The results suggest the existence of a long-term equilibrium relationship between our data series. 
The existence of a cointegrating relationship allows us to estimate a two-lag vector 
autoregressive error correction model (VECM) for both of our steel product categories.  
We estimate the reduced form vector error correction model: 
∑ +Π+Δ=Δ − ttitit YYAY ε  
where A1, A2 and  are matrices of parameters to estimate. The terms Π tYΠ  account for the long-
term equilibrium relationship among the variables, and it represents the error correction factor of 
the model. 
Next, we calculate cumulative impulse-response functions to estimate the impact of 
unexpected changes in China’s consumption upon price variables2, and vice versa, in our 
models. Finally, we perform forecast error variance decomposition analysis to show the 
contribution of China’s consumption of steel to the variance of the error made in predicting our 
price variables.  
 Our VECM and VARs include five variables each: the price of a steel commodity, 
China’s consumption of steel (China’s production plus imports minus exports), rest of world 
                                                 
2 For the remainder of this paper, “price variables” should be understood to mean iron ore, scrap and steel prices. 
consumption of steel (ROW production minus China’s imports plus China’s exports), the price 
of steel scrap and the price of iron ore. All data are monthly for the time period April 1998 to 
December 2007, the longest time period for which Chinese import-export data are available. All 
price data are indices tracked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). World and Chinese 
production statistics were obtained from the International Iron and Steel Institute, and rest of 
world production was obtained by subtracting Chinese production from world production. Steel 
import and export data for China were obtained from China Data Online, a service of the China 
Data Center at the University of Michigan3. 
  
3. Results 
3.1 Granger Testing 
 Granger-causality tests do little to clarify the causal relationship between Chinese 
consumption and the prices of steel and its inputs in our models. In many instances, bi-
directional causality is present. Therefore, the causality tests do not lead to a clear answer to the 
question as to whether Chinese consumption drives prices or if Chinese consumption, in fact, 
reacts to those prices. In general, Granger tests fail to reject the hypothesis that steel price 
fluctuations are not Granger-caused by fluctuations in Chinese steel consumption. The causal 
relationships between fluctuations in Chinese steel consumption and input price movements are 
unclear. Our analysis does show that steel price movements appear to be Granger-caused by 
input price movements. Including six lags shows that fluctuations in Chinese consumption are 
Granger-caused by fluctuations in iron prices and Granger-cause fluctuations in scrap prices. As 
                                                 
3 The accuracy of the Chinese statistics is subject to some doubt. Comparing annual values of the data series that we 
downloaded with those recorded by the UNCOM trade database revealed that while our Chinese import statistics are 
only slightly lower than those in the UNCOM data set, Chinese export statistics are much lower. 
we will show in the next section, some of these relationships appear spurious, producing 
nonsensical results. 
3.2 Cointegration 
The existence of a long-term relationship between two or more data series is revealed by 
testing for cointegration. Data series may be individually non-stationary, like those in our data, 
but a linear combination of them may be stationary if the variables are cointegrated. We test our 
data series for cointegration using the Johansen method for each of our two models. The null 
hypothesis using this method is that there exists at most the tested number of possible 
cointegrating relationships between the series in a data set. Since we reject the null hypothesis in 
the case of zero cointegrating relationships, but accept it in the case of one cointegrating 
relationship, we conclude that a cointegrating relationship exists among our variables. This result 
suggests that Chinese and world consumption levels appear to have a long-term relationship to 
price levels for steel, iron ore and scrap. To account for this equilibrium relationship, we build a 
vector autoregressive error correction model (VECM). This allows us to gauge the influence that 
unexpected shocks to certain variables have upon other variables after controlling for the 
equilibrium relationship that links these variables to one another. 
 
3.3 Impulse-Response Functions 
 Impulse-response functions show the reaction of one variable to an unexpected increase 
in the value of another variable. The emphasis on the word unexpected is to distinguish between 
expected increases, captured in the main body of the model, and unexpected increases that are 
not accounted for in the main body of the model. A one-unit increase in the impulse variable 
influences the response variable both directly and indirectly through its impact on all other 
variables. 
 Figures 6 and 7 below show cumulative impulse-response functions for our data. The 
graphs in Figure 6 show the response of price variables to unexpected increases in China’s 
consumption of steel, while the graphs in Figure 7 show the response of China’s consumption of 
steel to unexpected increases in price variables over thirty periods. They show some results that 
are in line with economic theory, and some that diverge from it, and likely from reality. For 
instance, one would expect the results that our models generated for the impact of an unexpected 
rise in Chinese steel consumption upon steel input prices (positive in both models for both 
inputs). Given that most of China’s consumption is supplied by China’s production, an increase 
in China’s consumption translates to an increase in China’s production, and therefore an increase 
in the country’s consumption of steel inputs, which would be expected to drive up prices. Given 
the premium paid in the Chinese spot market for iron ore in the short term, it is sensible that 
prices elsewhere would react to increased buying on that market (Economist March 2008). 
 However, our model generates several results that are not suggested by economic theory. 
First, it shows steel prices declining in response to an unexpected increase in Chinese 
consumption. One would expect instead that an increase in consumption, especially consumption 
that has been shown to increase input prices, would increase steel prices as well. Secondly, it 
shows Chinese consumption rising in response to an increase in steel prices in the flat products 
model. Thirdly, all models show China’s consumption of inputs increasing in response to an 
unexpected increase in the price of those inputs. These results are not what one would normally 
expect: it is unlikely that Chinese economic planners would choose to increase steel or steel 
input usage in response to prices increasing, unless, of course, they anticipate that the increase 
represents a new trend in pricing, and hurry to purchase these commodities. 
 
3.4 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis shows “the percentage of the 
variance of the error made in forecasting a variable… due to a specific shock… at a given 
horizon” (Stock and Watson 2001). This indicator shows the contribution of each of a set of 
variables to the variance of the error made in predicting a given variable. This allows us to assess 
the relative influence that each variable has on the variables of interest. For example, this type of 
analysis would show how much of the variance of the error for steel prices (the variance of the 
actual value from the forecasted value) can be attributed to changes in China’s consumption, and 
how much can be attributed to other variables. This analysis gives us some indication of how 
powerful the influence of China’s consumption is upon the price of steel and its inputs.  
In the long product model, China’s consumption only accounts for a significant portion of 
the variance observed in scrap prices, rising from less than one percent through the first eight 
periods, to over six percent by the thirtieth period following a shock in China’s consumption. In 
the flat product model, China’s consumption accounts for less than one percent of the variance 
observed in all prices in all thirty time periods. This result suggests that prices are not reacting to 
unexpected movements in China’s consumption. 
4. Conclusions 
 Although our analysis suggests that there is an equilibrium relationship between our 
consumption and price variables, the nature of the relationship between price variations for steel 
and its inputs and variations in China’s consumption of steel remains uncertain. Granger 
causality testing fails to show that variations in China’s consumption drive variations in steel 
prices, or vice versa. Impulse responses do not resolve this uncertainty. In fact, some responses 
to shocks make little economic sense, such as suggesting that a sudden increase in China’s 
consumption of steel causes steel prices to decrease. Variance decomposition analysis illustrates 
that little of the variation of price variables from models predicted by the model can be 
accounted for by China’s consumption. These results suggest that the recent volatility of steel 
input and output prices is not driven by changes in China’s consumption, at least when two lags 
are employed in the model. 
 It may be the case that China’s consumption of steel is driving the long-term trends that 
we observe in the prices of steel and its inputs, but that prices simply do not respond in two 
months to variations in China’s steel consumption. Perhaps production and consumption 
information do not travel rapidly through the market to affect prices, leaving those who negotiate 
contracts to speculate when determining price levels. Rapid expansion of Chinese production 
levels may coincide with uncertainty about actual production levels, causing prices to react to 
expectations made with imperfect information. Additionally, a disconnect between price levels 
and Chinese consumption decisions could lead to unexpected market outcomes that may explain 
the unexpected observations in our impulse response function analysis. 
Future research to unravel the relationship between China’s use of steel and prices for 
steel and its inputs could take a few directions. A model that could incorporate a longer lag time 
for changes in China’s consumption to affect prices might alter the impact that that variable has 
upon the price of various kinds of steel, especially if this information takes time to work its way 
through the market. Alternatively, a model that incorporates investment levels in China and 
elsewhere may better explain price movements by measuring demand for steel independently of 
production. Finally, since our price data are U.S. data, it may be appropriate to include some 
domestic factors to explain short-term price fluctuations, especially in the case of scrap, where 
export levels have not increased dramatically as prices have risen. However, it may not be until 
China’s consumption growth slows down that we are able to make sense of its impact upon the 
price for steel and its inputs. 
 
5. Technical Notes 
VAR modeling involves regressing stationary versions of each variable on lags of itself 
and the current and lagged values of the other variables in the model. Because this model 
assumes variables are stationary to produce accurate results, we first tested the individual data 
series for stationarity using augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. These tests revealed that the 
data were non-stationary, and therefore we differentiated each series in order to obtain stationary 
series. Each series required one differentiation to achieve the stationarity required for inclusion 
in a VAR model. 
In addition to the requirement that each variable be stationary, the entire vector itself 
must also be stationary in order to ensure that the results are not spurious. We therefore 
performed a test for joint-stationarity of our differentiated series. This test revealed that our 
differentiated data series were jointly stationary, and so we were able to proceed with the 
execution of our VAR model. 
While differentiating data in order to achieve stationarity is useful because it allows us to 
perform Granger-causality tests within a VAR model, doing so also involves the loss of some 
relevant economic information. Specifically, differenced variables no longer contain valuable 
information on long-run equilibrium that is contained in the actual levels of the data. For 
instance, prices and wages are two non-stationary economic variables that tend to move together 
over time.  
The existence of a long-term relationship between two or more data series is revealed by 
testing for cointegration. Data series may be individually non-stationary, like those in our data, 
but a linear combination of them may be stationary if the variables are cointegrated. We 
therefore tested our data series for cointegration. The results suggest that a long-term equilibrium 
between our variables does exist. Chinese and world consumption levels appear to have a long-
term relationship to price levels for steel, iron and scrap.  
Cointegration of data suggests the use of an economic model that accounts for the long-
term relationship between data series. A vector autoregressive error correction model, or VECM, 
estimates variables using both differenced and actual data, and accounts for long-term 
equilibrium suggested by economic theory. It does so by introducing a term that corrects for 
disequilibrium. We therefore re-estimate our model using this technique. 
In order to determine how many lags of each value to include in our VECM model, we 
utilized three forms of selection criteria: the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). According 
to the AIC, adding additional lags to the regressions always yields a better fit to the model. The 
HQIC yields weaker fits with increasing lags from 1-7 lags. The SBIC yields weaker fits with 
increasing lags from 1-11 lags. Because there is a trade-off between a better fit and less accurate 
coefficients with increasing lags, we have chosen to use a two-lag model. However, this choice 
may not capture all relevant information, as it may take more lags for China’s consumption to 
affect prices. 
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Appendix
Figure 1: 
China's Share of World Steel Production
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Figure 2: 
Chinese Production, Steel Balance and the Price of Steel, 1998-2008
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Figure 3 
 
Chinese Production of Steel, Iron Ore Deficit and the Price of Iron Ore 1996-2006
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Source of Current Account Statistics: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Source of Iron Ore Prices: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Source of China’s Production Statistics: International Iron and Steel Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4 
China's Production of Steel, Coke Surplus and the Price of Coke 1996-2006
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Source of Trade Statistics: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Source of Coke Prices: Energy Information Administration 
Source of Steel Production Statistics: International Iron and Steel Institute 
 
Figure 5: 
China's Steel Production, Balance of Scrap Trade and Scrap Prices, 1990-2006
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Source of Trade Statistics: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Source of Scrap Prices: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Source of Steel Production Statistics: International Iron and Steel Institute 
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Figure 7 
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